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CONFLICT IN THE MEASURE OF
CONTRACT DAMAGES - COST OF
PERFORMANCE (REPLACEMENT)
VERSUS
DIFFERENCE IN VALUE (INDEMNITY)
FRANK ZAID,
Osgoode Hall Law School of
York University
INTRODUCTION
The fundamental rule with regard to damages given to an innocent
party upon the breach of his contract by a defaulting party was laid down by
Lord Atkinson in the case of Wertheim v. Chicoutimi Pulp Co.:
And it is the general intention of the law that, in giving damages for breach of
contract, the party complaining should, so far as it can be done by money, be
placed in the same position as he would have been in if the contract had been
performed ... That is a ruling principle. It is a just principle.'
However, in trying to follow this rule, the courts have sometimes been
faced with the issue of a conflict in the measure of damages; this conflict comes
about by the problems raised by the following two considerations of Lord
Atkinson's rule:
1. Exactly what position would the complaining party have occupied
if the contract had been performed?
2. Just how far can the court go in awarding monetary compensation?
A conflict in the measure of damages often arises in building contract
cases in the following manner. A contracts with B to have B build a house
for A. The specifications are clearly defined in the contract. A refuses to pay
for the house and B brings an action for the contract price. A claims a reduc-
tion in the amount that it will take to alter or repair the house to conform
exactly with the specifications. B claims that A's reduction is simply the
difference in value between the house A contracted for and the house A
received. These two measures are referred to as the cost of performance
(or replacement) and the difference in value (or indemnity) respectively.
1 [1911] A.C. 301 at 307 (P.C.).
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The conflict also arises in "lost chance" or "speculative damages" situa-
tions. For example, M is a racetrack operator who sponsors a $150,000 race.
N enters his horse in a field of 8 horses, but then M decides he only wants
to race 7 horses and he scratches N's entry. N argues that his horse probably
would have won and he is entitled to substantial damages.
Another field in which the conflict appears is in oil or gas "test well"
cases. Take the situation where X has a lease on land and Y is a well-driller.
X contracts with Y to give Y a half-interest in any minerals discovered if Y
will drill a test well. Y defaults and X sues for the cost of drilling. X claims
that the only loss Y suffered is the difference in value between the land
before the contract was to be performed and after the contract was performed
and that this difference is negligible.
These problems do not arise often, but when they do the end result
often is confusion smothered with judicial jargon. The building contract cases
have been cluttered with confusing jargon for over a century and the explora-
tory work cases have been without rationale ever since a very misleadingjudgment twenty years ago. However, in recent years, the Courts have begun
to grapple with the issues and have laid down realistic and defined approaches.
The culmination of this problem of a conflict in the measure of damages has
recently resulted in an extremely substantial award of over $350,000 in
Dolly Varden Mines Ltd. (N.P.L.) v. Sunshine Exploration Ltd. et al.2
However, in order to best appreciate the problem, it is essential to retrace
the development of the law back many years.
PART I
The Basis of the Problem - the Early Building Contract Cases
and Their Development
Although the English courts had to face the problem of a conflict in the
measure of damages as early as 1855, 8 the problem was first squarely faced
in 1882 in the case of Wigsell v. School for Indigent Blind.4 In that case, the
plaintiffs sued for damages for the defendant's breach of its covenant to
erect a wall around part of its land, which it had bought from the plaintiffs,
adjacent to the plaintiffs' land. The defendant did not build the wall. The
cost of building the wall would have exceeded the diminution in the value
of the plaintiffs' land caused by the defendant's default. The plaintiffs did not
build the wall but sought to recover the cost of erecting the wall as damages.
It was held that the proper measure of damages was not the cost of erecting
the wall, but the monetary difference between the value of the plaintiff's land
upon the breach of the contract and what the value would have been had the
contract been performed. In considering the motives of the plaintiffs in not
bringing an action in the Court of Chancery for specific performance, Field
2 (1969), 8 D.L.R. (3d) 441 (S.C.C.), aff'g (1968), 69 D.L.R. (2d) 209
(BC.C.A.), ar'g (1967), 64 D.L.R. (2d) 683.
8 Pell v. Shearman (1855), 10 Ex. 766, 156 E.R. 560.
4 (1882), 8 Q.B.D. 357.
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J., touched upon the real issues behind the court's analysis of the problem:
But it was also open to the plaintiffs to do what they have done, viz., bring this
action for damages, in which event they will be under no obligation whatever to
expend the amount recovered in erecting the wall, and most probably would never
think for a moment of any such expenditure, which to us, at least, would seem
a simple waste of the money.5
Thus, Field, J. really went beneath the superficial contract and he con-
sidered its true rationale - did the parties contract for a simple sale of land
or for a sale of land with an understanding that it was absolutely essential
that the wall be built? Or, were the plaintiffs unconcerned about the wall but
merely seeking a windfall recovery in the form of damages measured by the
high cost of performance? How certain can the court be that the aggrieved
party will have the contact performed if and when he is awarded the cost of
performance? And, most important, by granting such expensive relief, would
the courts not be pursuing a policy which would, in effect, be "a simple waste
of money"?
The first Canadian case dealing with this type of conflict in the measure
of damages was Wood v. Stringer.6 The work in question was the building
of a church; the last of the work completed was the pews. As the pews were
being put in, objection was made to their material and workmanship. To
replace the inferior materials would have cost $185, whereas the difference
in value between the bad materials and the better materials which should
have been put in was estimated at only $25. In this case, however, the
owners spent $35 for repairs themselves. In assessing the Master's award
of only $25 for the difference in value, Boyd, C. said:
That allowance can hardly be deemed an adequate measure of the set-off or
deduction to which the proprietors are entitled.7
He then stated that the owners were entitled to have deducted from the con-
tract price at least the $35 for repairs and the $25 for inferior materials.
If either party objected the matter was to go back to the Master on a reference.
The case seems to suggest that once it can honestly be said that the
owners did contract for the work to be done in a certain manner and that
this manner was essentially what the innocent party bargained for (as exem-
plified in this case by the fact that the owners took it upon themselves to
repair the poor work), then the court will award more than the difference in
value between the work contracted for and the work received. Moreover,
the fact that the owners had taken action subsequent to the breach to have
the pews built in a particular manner prompted the judge to allow the higher
damages.
However, the first Canadian judge to really pierce the issue and to
develop a sound reason or policy for awarding the cost of performance was
Wetmore, J. in two cases which he decided in the Northwest Territories. In
the second of these cases, Allen v. Pierce,8 he applied the principles which he
himself had enunciated in the earlier case of Clarke v. Lee.9 The Allen case
61d. at 363-364.
6 (1890), 20 O.R. 148 (Ch.Div.).
7 Id. at 152.
8 (1895), 3 Terr.L.R. 319.
9 (1893), 3 Terr. L.R. 191.
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was an action on a building contract brought by the contractor against the
owner to recover the balance of the contract price. However, the evidence
was that the work had not been done in the manner for which the parties had
contracted. Wetmore, J., in dealing with the issue of damages available to
the owner, explored the underlying issue of just what the basis of the contract
was:
[I]t is not a mere matter of difference between the value of the material supplied
and that contracted for, or of the work done and that which ought to have been
built under the contract. If these were the standards of damages there would be
no point in a man contracting for the best materials; he might as well contract
at the start for an inferior quality, because they are cheaper. The owner of the
building is, therefore, entitled to recover such damages, or to have such deductions
made as will put him in a position to have just the building he contracted for.10
Thus, the correct measure of damages was the sum which it would take
to put the owner in such a position as to have the building altered so as to
make it in accordance with the contract. Certainly this award meets the
expectation interest of the innocent party.
Thus, Wetmore, J. set out a further policy consideration for awarding
the expectation interest and for recognizing the reliance of the innocent
party. If the measure of damages is simply the difference in value between
the building as contracted for and built, then the owner has wasted his time
in contracting for good materials and good workmanship - any builder
would be able to deliver poor quality and workmanship and still be paid.
Moreover, if the quality of the building is not that for which the owner
contracted, he is faced with the situation whereby he must accept and pay
for a building for which he did not contract and which he does not want.
The owner must be able to get the cost of performance if he has made it
clear that his intentions and expectations were to contract not for any building,
but for a building of a certain specified quality.
The underlying idea of determining exactly what the innocent party
bargained for and what he reasonably could expect was a major consideration
in the case of M. J. O'Brien Ltd. v. Freedman."
The facts of the case were as follows. In a written contract for a sale
by the plaintiffs and purchase by the defendant of buildings which had be-
come useless to the plaintiffs and which they wished to have removed from
their land, there was no express undertaking by the defendant to remove the
buildings, but in the written agreement a definite time was set aside for that
purpose. The defendant paid the consideration-money and entered and
removed part of the buildings but left the foundations. The plaintiffs claimed
that the correct measure of damages was the $10,000 cost of placing them
10 (1895), 3 Terr.L.R. 319 at 323. The learned judge's decision was largely based
on a statement taken from Addison on Contracts (9th ed.) 807 which said:
Where a party engages to do certain work in a certain specified manner but
does not perform the work so as to correspond with the specification he is
not entitled to recover the price agreed upon, nor can he recover according to
the actual value of the work done; what the plaintiff is entitled to recover is
the price agreed upon in the specification subject to a deduction; and the
measure of that deduction is the sum which it would take to alter the work to
make it correspond with the specification.
This statement was originally quoted in the Clark case, supra, note 9 at 192.
11 (1923), 54 O.L.R. 455 (Ont.C.A.).
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in the same position as if the contract had been performed (i.e. the cost of
performance); however, the defendant contended that the plaintiffs were
only entitled to the $1,000 cost of the depreciation of the value of the land.
The trial judge awarded damages based on the cost of performance. How-
ever, in the Court of Appeal, the award was based on the difference in value.
One of the reasons why the Court of Appeal reduced the award was because
they found on the contract that the defendant was not under an express
obligation to remove the foundations. Therefore, the opinions expressed
on the issue of the measure of damages are largely obiter; however, Fergu-
son, J.A. stated that even if there had been an express obligation on the
part of the defendant to remove the foundations, a determining factor in
arriving at the correct measure would be a consideration of the benefits
which each party could reasonably be expected to derive from the per-
formance:
[I]t may be that, if the defendant expressly, and without doubt, undertook to
remove these foundations, and it appeared that the contract was entered into for
some special purpose, or to acquire some benefit or fancied benefit which the
plaintiffs sought to get, the Court should and would direct specific performance
of such a contract; but, where it appears that there was no special reason for
making a contract to remove the foundations ... and that the cost of removal is
out of all proportion to any benefit, real or fanciful, that the plaintiffs could get
from the performance of the obligation, and that damages is an adequate remedy,
the trial judge was not, I think, required ... to award as damages the expense or
cost of performing the work contracted to be done. His duty was, I think, to
award the plaintiffs, as pecuniary compensation and damages, the difference
pecuniarily estimated between what the plaintiffs' position would have been if
the contract had been fulfilled and their existing position.12
The underlying reasons for the importance of the benefit argument are
threefold. First, there is the problem previously mentioned with regard to
the Wigsell'3 case - by granting the cost of performance the Court may be
giving a windfall to the innocent party, if the benefit of the contract was not
known by the defaulting party. Secondly, unless such expected benefit could
reasonably have been made known to the defaulting party, how can the Court
hold that party to the higher measure of damages and at the same time insist
that contract damages are not punitive? And, thirdly, will the Court not,
in some cases, be encouraging economic waste if the measure of damages is
the higher cost of performance? 14
Thus, in considering the problem of whether or not to award the cost
of performance as the measure of damages, the courts, in these early build-
ing contract cases, have seen fit to explore the following questions:
(1) Was the part of the contract which was not performed an essential
part for which the innocent party really bargained?
(2) Was the innocent party's intention clearly known by the defaulting
party?
(3) Will the innocent party get a windfall if he is given the higher award?
(4) Can it reasonably be said that the innocent party will, indeed, have
this necessary construction completed?
'
21d. at 465-466.
13 (1882), 8 Q.B.D. 357; See discussion pp. 180-181, supra.
14 The leading case in the United States on this point is Jacob & Youngs v. Kent,
230 N.Y. 239, 129 N.E. 889, 23 A.L.R. 1429 (1921), where Cardozo, J. refused to grant
the cost of performance because it was out of proportion to the good to be attained.
1971]
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(5) Will the courts encourage economic waste if the higher award is given?
(6) What real benefit would have accrued to the innocent party if the con-
tract had been performed? That is, is the benefit expected just an increase
in the value of the land or is it some special benefit which the innocent party
could only get by contracting expressly for it?
PART II
The "Lost Chance" or "Speculative Damages" Problem
Another area of damages in which the courts have been faced with
the difficult problem of having to decide on conflicting measures of damages
is that of "speculative' or "lost chance" damages. This area is often dis-
cussed under the topics of remoteness and quantum (nominal vs. sub-
stantial damages); however, conflicts in the measure of damages often arise
in "lost chance" or "speculative damages" cases.
One of the leading authorities in this area is the English case of
Chaplin v. Hicks. 5 In that case, the Court of Appeal affirmed a
judgment awarding £100 to the plaintiff for her loss of a chance to win a
prize. The defendant had selected the plaintiff as one of fifty people chosen
from a group of six thousand entrants; of the fifty, twelve were to be further
selected and offered theatrical engagements. The defendant failed to give
the plaintiff a reasonable opportunity of being interviewed in accordance
with the advertised rules.
The Court of Appeal, in upholding the award for substantial, rather
than nominal, damages was confronted with a conflict in the measure of
damages appropriate in such a "lost chance" case. There is a breach of
contract; however, there is little or no reliance placed on the contract by the
innocent party. Damages (expectation) must flow from the breach - yet
is the proper compensation the higher award arrived at by assuming that
the entrant would be selected and thereby giving her the monetary equiva-
lent of the reward, or is it the lower award arrived at by assuming that the
entrant would not be selected and thereby giving her nothing?
Two principles adopted in the case suggest that the Court is really
intent on punishing the wrongdoer and on giving the innocent party sub-
stantial monetary compensation for the lost chance on which she might
reasonably have relied. First, the Court expounded the old principle that
the fact that damages cannot be assessed with certainty does not relieve
the wrongdoer of paying damages for his wrong. Secondly, the Court agreed
that the jury's award should be upheld, even if the amount of their verdict
was really a matter of guesswork. Considering the normal requirement that
damages must be proven, these two points certainly bear out the probability
that the Court will not allow a wrongdoer to breach a contract without having
to pay for his breach.
15 [1911] 2 K.B. 786 (CA.).
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The headnote of the case, often quoted in subsequent cases, seems to
suggest that a deprived entrant, in order to collect substantial damages, must
show that he would have been a member of a select and limited group; how-
ever, the important point to note is that substantial, and not nominal, dam-
ages are available on the basis of a "lost chance":
Where by contract a man has a right to belong to a limited class of competitors
for a prize, a breach of that contract by reason of which he is prevented from
continuing a member of the class and is thereby deprived of all chance of
obtaining the prize is a breach in respect of which he may be entitled to recover
substantial, and not merely nominal, damages.' 6
The Chaplin case was considered in a case before the British Columbia
Court of Appeal, McGee v. Clarke.'7 In that case, the defendant obtained
from the plaintiff a transfer of the plaintiff's unexplored mineral claim under
an agreement to pay her $1000 as soon as he should sell it; the defendant
also agreed to keep up the assessment work in the meantime. He allowed
the claim to lapse for default in assessment work and it was lost as it was
re-staked by another.
Comparing the instant case with the Chaplin case, MacDonald, C.I.A.
said that the present case was "a very much stronger case, a case of the
deprivation of the plaintiff of her mineral claim by default on the defendant's
part.'U
In assessing damages, Galliher, J.A. rejected the plaintiff's claim for the
$1000 mentioned in the agreement. The Court held that the proper
measure of damages should be the value of the property the plaintiff lost by
reason of the defendant's breach of the contract. Since the plaintiff could
offer no significant evidence of the value of the property, damages of only
$50 were awarded.
In speaking of the value of the property, MacDonald, C.I.A. said:
An unexplored mineral claim is of speculative value. Its value can only be deter-
mined by what it will bring in the speculative market. Its real value cannot be
ascertained except by the expenditure of money in exploitation.19
Several points are worth noting here. First, it seems that the court
places the onus on the innocent party to prove the worth of his land. In
view of the facts that both parties agreed to pay $1000 in the event of a
sale and that the intention of the parties was for the possible sale, why
should the totally innocent party be burdened with the onus? 20 Secondly,
the plaintiff received absolutely no benefits from the contract while the de-
fendant received the transfer of the mineral claim and possible value if
minerals were discovered or if sale was completed. Certainly the court took
little effort to compensate the plaintiff for her three losses - loss of possible
sale, loss of mineral rights, and loss of alternate contract with another party.
And if the measure of damages is the value of the lost property, why
shouldn't these other three losses be taken into consideration in evaluating
16Id. at 786.
17 [1927] 1 W.W.R. 593; 38 B.C.R. 156 (B.C.C.A.).
'Id. at 594, 38 B.C.R. at 158.
19 Id.20 The burden of proof problem has been considered in "oil test well" cases in the
United States. See W.O. Roberts Jr., Damages - Measure of Damages for Breach of
Contract to Drill Oil or Gas Wells (1956), 13 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 207.
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the worth of the property? It seems that the Court, in assessing damages,
lost sight of the basic principles of reasonable foreseeability and intention of
the parties.
An earlier case in which the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal took a
more realistic approach to a similar problem was McGee v. Rosetown
Electric Light and Power Co. Ltd.21 A contract for the sinking of a well pro-
vided that if no water were obtained after a specified depth the contractor
was to receive a certain remuneration per foot sunk, but if water were ob-
tained at the said or a lesser depth the contractor was to be remunerated at
a higher rate. The contractor was compelled by the default of the other party
to discontinue the work.
Brown, I., in dealing with the measure of damages, made quite clear
his position that the innocent party should get the benefit of the higher
award:
There is no way, apart from the actual process of sinking the well, of ascertaining
what might have happened. The defendants, by their action in refusing to carry
out the contract, have placed the plaintiff in the position where he is deprived of
the privilege of making the test.22
In considering the contractual intention of the parties, he continued,
As it was quite possible within the contemplation of the parties that the plaintiff
would have sunk the well 500 feet, and at that depth secured the necessary flow
of water, and as that is the possibility most favourable from the plaintiff's point
of view, I am of opinion that his damages should be assessed on that basis. 23
The measure of damages seems quite appropriate: both parties in-
tended and contracted to drill to the specified depth and there was a rea-
sonable chance that water would be found. It is not unreasonable for the
defendant to expect that the plaintiff's benefit from the contract might have
been the speculation or the chance that water would be found. Why should
the Court not give the innocent well-driller compensation for his lost part of
the bargain - the speculation or chance? However, the difficulty in deter-
mining the value of a "lost chance" seems to have influenced the Court in
awarding damages as if the chance had been realized.
Another important case on the question of speculative damages is
Carson v. Willitts.24 Here the plaintiff entered into a contract with the de-
fendant whereby, in consideration of a share in certain rights which the
plaintiff had acquired, the defendant undertook to bore three wells in order
to explore a certain territory for oil. The defendant bored one well and
then refused to bore the other two. The plaintiff's claim for damages caused
the court to consider whether nominal or substantial damages should be
awarded.
Masten, J.A. considered the damages that the plaintiff should be
awarded:
In my opinion, what the plaintiff lost by the refusal of the defendant to bore two
more wells was a sporting or gambling chance that valuable oil or gas would be
21 [1918] 1 W.W.R. 552 (Sask.CA.).
22 Id. at 555.
23 Id. at 556.
24 (1930), 65 O.L.R. 456; [1930] 4 D.L.R. 977 (Ont.CA.).
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found when the two further wells were bored. If the wells had been bored and
no oil or gas of value had been found, the effect would be that the plaintiff has
lost nothing by the refusal of the defendant to go on boring. On the other hand,
if valuable oil or gas had been discovered, by the boring of these two wells, he
has lost substantially. It may not be easy to compute what that chance was worth
to the plaintiff but the difficulty in estimating the quantum is no reason for
refusing to award any damages. 25
He then directed that the plaintiff was entitled to recover for the loss
of the chance that valuable oil or gas might have been discovered.
The decision has been questioned, and rightly so, in subsequent cases.26
The loss is not as serious as was the loss in McGee v. Clarke27 where time
was of the essence or as in McGee v. Rosetown Electric28 where the con-
tractor lost his chance of speculation; here, the plaintiff owner made no
effort to seek substitute performance or to mitigate his damages. Damages
on the usual basis of the difference between the contract price and the market
price of drilling could have been awarded without taking away the plaintiff's
loss of chance.
The one point overlooked by the Court in Carson v. Willitts and which
could have distinguished that case from the other cases is the problem of
evidence. In Carson there was no evidence that any oil would have been
found if the other two wells had been drilled. In fact, the evidence was, if
anything, unfavourable from the plaintiff's point of view since the one well
which had been bored revealed nothing. However, in Chaplin v. Hicks2 9
there was evidence adduced to show that the plaintiff had a one-in-four
chance of success. The Court there considered that this constituted evidence
equivalent of a "reasonable probability of the plaintiff's being a prize-
winner."30
Therefore, if more than nominal damages are to be awarded in a case
of "lost chance" or "speculative damages", it is essential that the claimant
adduce sufficient evidence to show that he had a reasonably probable chance
of success in his venture. It was this consideration of sufficiency of evidence
which prompted the Supreme Court of Canada to explain Chaplin and to
criticize Carson in the case of Kinkel v. Hyman.31 In the latter case the
defendants were directors of a company and held stock of a second com-
pany in trust for their shareholders. They sold this stock to the plaintiff
without first having obtained the consent of their shareholders. The plaintiff
25 Id. at 458, [1930] 4 D.L.R. at 980.
26 See, e.g., Kinkel v. Hyman, [1939], 4 D.L.R. 1 at 7, [1939] S.C.R. 364 at 386,
where Crocket, J., discusses the Carson case and states that substantial damages should
not have been awarded in that case.
See also Kranz v. McCutcheon (1920) 19 O.W.N. 161 (Ont.C.A.), where the de-
fendant drilled only two out of five wells which he had contracted to drill. The evidence
was that the general reputation of the oil fieldhad declined because of the first two
failures. The trial judge directed a reference on the basis of substantial damages as the
proper award. The Court of Appeal varied this direction by striking out the words
"substantial damages" and substituting the words "the damages, if any, sustained."
27 [1927] 1 W.W.R. 593; 38 B.C.R. 156 (B.C.C.A.).
28 [1918] 1 W.W.R. 552 (Sask.C.A.).
29 [1911] 2 K.B. 786 (C.A.).
30 Id. per Fletcher Moulton, LJ., at 795.
31 [1939], 4 D.L.R. 1, [1939] S.C.R. 364.
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then resold a large proportion of the stock to the defendant directors in
return for a 9 month's option to repurchase a portion of them providing
that the defendants obtained ratification of the first transaction by 51%
of their shareholders at a general meeting. The defendants did not call a
meeting within the 9 month period of the option. The plaintiff brought an
action for breach of contract.
It was held by the Supreme Court of Canada that there was a breach
of contract. However, the Court allowed only nominal damages because the
plaintiff could offer no evidence upon which a finding could be made that
there was a reasonable probability that a general meeting of the shareholders
would have approved the first transaction, and that the option would have
been of real monetary value. In considering the Chaplin and Carson cases,
Crocket, I., gave this explanation:
For my part I can find no authority in either Chaplin v. Hicks or Carson v.
Willitts justifying any Court in awarding any more than a nominal sum as
damages for the loss of a mere chance of possible benefit except upon evidence
proving that there was some reasonable probability of plaintiff realizing there-
from an advantage of some real substantial monetary value.32
On the basis of the above reasoning, Crocket, J. stated that substantial
damages should not have been awarded in the Carson case and that they
should not be awarded in the case before him.
In summary, the Kinkel case has somewhat clarified the approach whic4
Canadian courts take in "lost chance" or "speculative damages" cases. The
following points must be noted:
(1) if there is not a reasonable opportunity for the aggrieved party to seek
alternate performance or if he is a member of a select group of persons, then
the Court will award substantial damages;
(2) evidence must be adduced to show that the claimant lost a reasonable
probability of realizing an advantage of some real substantial monetary value;
(3) the Courts will do whatever possible to see that the innocent party
gets the benefit of the doubt of the outcome of the speculation in order to
thereby award substantial damages.
However, it is this third point, although pervasive throughout the cases,
that the Courts often hide behind their judgments. Perhaps a new class of
damages called "reasonably hopeful expectation" should be considered!
PART III
The "Failure to Drill" Problem - The Cotter Case and its
Misapplications
Closely related to the "speculative damages" problem is the problem
which arises when a party has failed to drill a well or to do development
82 Id. at 7, [19391 S.C.R. at 386.
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work as promised in a contract.38 The turning point of these cases came with
the Supreme Court of Canada decision in 1950 in Cotter v. General Petrol-
eums Ltd. and Superior Oils Ltd.34 However, in order to best evaluate the
decision in the Cotter case, it is essential to study the earlier case of Cunning-
ham v. Insinger,85 a case which was quickly distinguished in Cotter.
In the Cunningham case, the respondent mine owner gave the appellant
mine operator an option to purchase an operating mine. When the first
instalment payment fell due, the operator procured from the owner an exten-
sion of time for payment upon the condition that the operator do certain
development work consisting of tunnelling which had not been mentioned
in the original option. The operator failed to make the required payments
and he relinquished possession of the mine and surrendered his option with-
out having done the work. The owner sued for damages amounting to the
cost of the work. The trial Judge gave judgment for the owner directing a
reference to ascertain the quantum of damages for all tunnelling work not
done by the operator, thus determining that the proper measure of damages
was the cost of the work to the owner which the operator had failed to per-
form. This judgment was affirmed in the British Columbia Court of Appeal;
in the Supreme Court of Canada the measure of damages became the major
issue.
Duff and Anglin, JJ. dealt with the question of damages and held that
in the circumstances of this particular case the cost of doing the work was
the proper measure. Chief Justice Davies and Mignault, J., while concurring
in the result, did not deal with the issue of damages and Idington, J. dis-
sented. Duff, J. after referring to the argument of counsel that the plaintiff
is entitled to recover, and only entitled to recover, the pecuniary value of
the advantage he would have obtained by a performance of the contract
which would, in this case, be the equivalent of any increase in the value of
the mine to arise therefrom said:
Cases may no doubt arise in which the test suggested by [Counsel's] argument
would be the only proper test, and difficult and intricate as the inquiry might be,
it would be the duty of the Court to enter upon an examination of the effect of
doing the work upon the value of the property.
On the other hand, cases must arise in which the plaintiff's right is plainly to
recover at least the cost of doing the work. If it were conclusively made out, for
example, that the work to be done formed part and a necessary part of some plan
of exploration or development requisite, from the miner's point of view, for
developing the property as a working mine, and necessary, from the point of view
of businesslike management, so that it might fairly be presumed that in the event
of the option lapsing the owner would in the ordinary course have the work com-
pleted, then the damages arising in the ordinary course would include the cost of
doing the work and would accordingly be recoverable under the rule.
In the case before us I think no serious difficulty arises. The letters appear to
afford abundant evidence that both parties were proceeding upon the footing that
this work was necessary in the course of developing the mine according to the
83 Although this problem has already been touched upon in the previous discussion
of the case of Carson v. Willitts (1930), 65 O.L.R. 456; [1930] 4 D.L.R. 977 (Ont.C.A.).
I will dismiss that case since the decision has been practically overruled by Kinkel v.
Hyman [19391, 4 D.L.R. 1, S.C.R. 364. See also Kranz v. McCutcheon (1920), 19
O.W.N. 161 (Ont. C.A.). For a recent article covering this field alone, see M. Sychuk,
Damages for Breach of an Express Drilling Covenant (1970), 8 Alta.L.Rev. 250.
34 [19501 4 D.L.R. 609, [1951] S.C.R. 154, rev'g [1949] 3 D.L.R. 634, [1949] 2
W.W.R. 146, rev'g [1949] 1 W.W.R. 193.
85 [1924] 2 D.L.R. 433; [1924] S.C.R. 8.
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owner's plans and it is upon the basis of that being accepted as a fact, I think,
that the trial Judge proceeded.3 6
And in holding as he did, Duff, J. was clearly of the view that he was
applying in a special way the general rule relating to assessment of damages:
As already intimated, however, I am not disposed to base my decision upon any
supposed rule of law other than the general rule to which reference has been
made. Having regard to the manner in which the case was conducted in the
Courts of British Columbia, I think the proper application of the general rule
is that which I have indicated above.37
Anglin, J. also stated that this was a special case in which the cost of per-
formance should be awarded:
[I]t is a fair inference not only that the plaintiff regards the work as essential but
that it is work which he will have done. It is probably necessary to reach that
conclusion in order to justify the departure made by the trial Judge from the
ordinary rule that the measure of damages for breach by a defendant of a con-
tract to perform work on the plaintiff's land is the actual pecuniary loss sustained
by the plaintiff as a result of such breach, i.e., the difference between what would
have been the value of the premises had the work contracted for been done and
their value with it unperformed.38
These judgments make it clear that no special rule is applied to decide
whether or not the measure of damages will be the cost of performance. The
general rule awarding the expectation interest is departed from or applied
in a special way only to this effect: if a finding can be made that the work
agreed to be done forms a part of a scheme or plan, the execution of which
the owner regards as essential to the proper development of the property,
and if it can be fairly presumed that the owner intends in any event to
carry out the work, then the damages may include the cost of the performance
of the work.
The rule seems simple enough. However, does not the rule really say
what I have been proposing all along - i.e., the Courts will award the cost
of performance if performance is essentially what the innocent party bar-
gained for? Isn't this approach really the same approach which the Courts
have taken in the building contracts cases and the speculative damages cases?
The Courts seem to be asking whether the contract was simply for some gen-
eral development work or for some special work which, if not performed as
specified, would disrupt the larger benefit or plan. Perhaps the "benefits"
approach can be explained in terms of the "necessary part of some plan ...
for developing the property"39 in Duff, J.'s terminology. Here there is, be-
yond any doubt, a measure of awarding the reliance interest. Although the
breach of the contract may have involved only the digging of a tunnel, the
success of the larger plan of development was largely dependent on this one
tunnel. And the owner reasonably could rely on the contract to the effect
that the tunnel would be dug. If the Courts simply award damages on the
normal scale, the owner does not get what he bargained for, nor does he get
compensation for his reasonable reliance. Furthermore, the Court (per Duff
and Anglin, J3. in this case) seems to decide if the work was essential on
the basis of whether or not it is likely that the owner will have the work done
36 Id. at 437-438, [1924] S.C.R. at 14-15.
87 Id. at 438, [1924] S.C.R. at 15.38 Id. at 439, [1924] S.C.R. at 16.
30 Id. at 437, [1924] S.C.R. at 14.
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in any event. This test, however, is as old as the Wigsell case which I dis-
cussed earlier.40 The Courts simply do not want to give uneconomic damages
or windfall awards in the form of damages measured by the cost of per-
formance to a party who is not likely to have the work done at all.
The Cunningham test seems easy enough to apply. However, when
the Cunningham case came to be applied some twenty-six years later, the
case was distinguished. This was in the famous case of Cotter v. General
Petroleums Ltd. and Superior Oil Ltd.,41 a case in which the judgments of
the Supreme Court of Canada are so ambiguous that it has taken at least one
wrongly decided case42 and nearly twenty years to straighten out the issue of
the proper measure of damages. However, we shall discuss those problems
later on. 43
In the Cotter case the owner of petroleum and natural gas under certain
Alberta lands granted an option on the resources. Clause 2 provided the
option would be exercised within a specified time by the optionees erecting
the necessary machinery on the lands and commencing the drilling of a well.
Clause 3 contained a covenant by the optionees to exercise the option in the
time specified by clause 2, and provided that, upon failure to do so, the
optionor would be entitled to exercise any remedies for breach of the cove-
nant despite the lapse of the option. It was agreed by the parties that the
covenant was given as consideration for the granting of the option. McLaurin
J., in the trial Court, held first, that there was a binding obligation on the
optionee to drill a well and, secondly, that the proper measure of damages
for the failure to do so was the $53,500 it would cost to drill. An appeal
to the Alberta Supreme Court was allowed, but on the ground of repugnancy
in the documents; the case then came before the Supreme Court of Canada.
The Court allowed the appeal on the question of damages fixing them in the
amount of $1,000. Kerwin, J., with whom Rinfret, C.J.C. agreed, held that
upon a proper consideration of the documents there was no obligation on
the optionees to drill a well at all,44 and, while he agreed that the plaintiff
should have more than nominal damages, he reduced them to $1,000. On
the question of damages he said,
Notwithstanding that the appellant's case was put as if the respondents' covenant
was to dig a well, which as I have indicated is not in my view its proper con-
struction, the appellant is entitled to more than nominal damages.
The proper measure is not the cost of performance to the respondents but the
value of performance to the appellant: Erie County Natural Gas & Fuel Co. v.
Carroll, [1911] A.C. 105. Adapting Lord Atkinson's language at the foot of
p. 118, it was the appellant's business to show the damages and he cannot be per-
mitted to recover damages on guesswork or surmise.45
Locke, I. dissented from the result without dealing with the question ot
damages and Cartwright, J., with whom Fauteux, J., agreed, held that there
was a clear obligation on the optionees to drill a well and awarded damages
4 0 See, discussion supra.
41 [19501 4 D.L.R. 609, [1951] S.C.R. at 154.
42 Prudential Trust Co. Ltd. and Wagner v. Wagner Oils Ltd. (1954), 11 W.W.R.
(N.S.) 371 (Alta.S.C.).
43 See, discussion infra.
44 [19501 4 D.L.R. 609 at 614-615, [19511 S.C.R. at 160.
45 Id.
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in the amount of $1,000. After approving the statement by Lord Atkinson
in Wertheim v. Chicoutimi Pulp Co.,46 Cartwright 1. continued:
What further benefits would have resulted to the appellant from the performance
of the contract? If the respondents had drilled the well to the prescribed depth
and it had proved a producer, the appellant would have received, (a) his share
of the proceeds, and, (b) the benefit of having the head lease validated, by theperformance of the lessee's covenant to drill, not only as to the 80 acres described
in the sublease but as to the whole 160 acres described in the head lease. If on
the other hand, as, from the evidence of the geologists, would seem much more
probable, the well had proved a failure the appellant would not have receivedbenefit (a) but would have received benefit (b). It must be remembered, how-
ever, that as a result of the respondents' breach the appellant holds the whole
160 acres free from any claim of the respondents. No part of the consideration
which under the contract would have passed to the respondents has passed, except
that from April 21, 1948 until some time in June, 1948, when they repudiated the
agreement, the respondents had rights in the 80 acres and the appellant was not
free to deal therewith. Under these circumstances, I do not think that the cost
of drilling is the proper measure of damages. Suppose that instead of the con-
sideration set out m the contract the appellant had agreed to pay the respondents$53,500 to drill the well and the respondents had repudiated the contract before
the date set for the commencement of the work and before any monies had beenpaid to them. In such a case by analogy to the rule in the case of building
contracts the measure of damages would seem to be the difference (if any)
between the price of the work agreed upon and the cost to which the appellant
was actually put in its completion. I think it will be found that those cases in
which it has been held that the cost of drilling is the proper measure of damages
are cases where the consideration to be given for the drilling had actually passed
to the defendant. Examples of such cases are Cunningham v. Insiger, [1924] 2
D.L.R. 433, [1924] S.C.R. 8, and Pell v. Shearman (1855), 10 Exch. 766, 156
E.R. 650 (a contract to sink a shaft). 47
Thus, while Kerwin, J. and Rinfret, C.J.C. based their judgments on
the finding that there was no obligation to drill, and, therefore, the rule in
Cunningham v. Insinger could not apply, Cartwright and Fauteux, JJ.
distinguished the Cunningham case upon the basis that in the case at hand
no part of the consideration for the drilling had actually passed to the defend-
ant. They distinguished those cases in which the measure of damages was
held to be the cost of the drilling upon the ground that they were cases in
which consideration had entirely passed. Cartwright, J. held in the particula
circumstances of the Cotter case that the measure of damages was th.
difference between the value to the owner of the consideration that he had
agreed to give for drilling the well, and the value to him of the consideration,
which acting reasonably he would have to give to have the well drilled by
others, and there was no evidence on the value of this consideration.
This line of reasoning has done nothing to clarify the problem of the
conflict in the measure of damages - the Cunningham decision can be easily
interpreted in terms of economic benefit and the essential basis of the bargain.
However, by introducing the idea of the sufficiency of consideration, Cart-
wright, I. has departed from the rule that the Courts will not consider
adequacy of consideration and has done nothing other than hide the real
issue. Certainly here, as in most of the other cases, the problem is simply
the question of what the parties really bargained for, and whether or not the
part of the contract to do work really went to the essence of the bargain.
Cartwright, J. could have applied the Cunningham test in this manner:
46 [1911] A.C. 301 at 307 (P.C.).
47 [1950] 4 D.L.R. 609 at 628, [1951] S.C.R. at 174-175.
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although the drilling constituted the total plan of exploration or development,
the plaintiff, by his conduct, has shown that he would not have had the
work completed in the ordinary course of development.48 In such a case, the
correct measure of damages is the difference in value, and not the cost of
performance. However, this leads to the exact problem which Cotter pre-
sented. What the Court really did was limit the aggrieved party's expectation
interest to what he could prove - and how can one prove speculative
damages and lost reliance on a chance of finding oil? This, of course, takes
us back to the "lost chance' or "speculative damages" problem. Had the
Court taken notice of the Kinkel and Chaplin cases, then Cotter's failure to
prove that he had been deprived of some reasonable probability of realizing
an advantage of some real substantial monetary value would have meant, on
the facts of the case, that he could only recover nominal damages.49
The Court seemed to have pre-decided that Cotter would not, in any
event, get the cost of performance; the reasons are obvious: Cotter did not,
to a significant degree, seek substitute performance; he did not attempt to
mitigate; and the award of the cost of performance might have been a wind-
fall recovery as it was doubtful (or impossible) that he would have had the
work done in any event. All these factors should be considered; but why did
the Court hide them? The same result could have been achieved by applying
the Cunningham test and by ignoring the adequacy or passing of consideration.
The Supreme Court's decision has done nothing other than confuse the issue
by bringing in new terms and tests. Since this type of case does not come
before the Supreme Court of Canada very often, the only recourse which the
Court possesses is simply to distinguish the Cotter case and to apply the
Cunningham case on the basis of factual distinction, and this is exactly what
the Court has done some twenty years later in its most recent decision.
However, we shall get to that soon enough.50
Before leaving Cotter and all its complexities, there is one further point
related to the problem of nominal versus substantial damages. In the case
of Prudential Trust Co. Ltd. and Wagner v. Wagner Oils Ltd.,51 McLaurin,
C.JT.D., who was the trial Judge in the Cotter case, dealt with the breach
of a contract in which the defendant had an absolute commitment to drill an
oil well in the following manner:
If it were not for the Cotter decision, I would be disposed to fix the damages
at some substantial amount, probably the cost of drilling a well. I still see nothing
unfair in visiting a defaulting party with damages in this amount The whole
foundation of legitimate promotional efforts in the exploitation of oil are based
48 On the facts of Cotter, the Cunningham test as proposed might have been a bit
difficult to apply. The evidence in the case was that the plaintiff had been in negotiation
with an oil company; however, there was no evidence as to the terms offered by the
company. Cartwright and Fauteux JJ., were influenced by the fact that the plaintiff had
not delayed bringing his action until the arrangements to have the well drilled by the
oil company had been completed. The plaintiff tendered no concrete evidence on his
negotiations with the oil company and made no request in the Alberta Supreme Court,
Appellate Division, for a reference to fix the damages. Thus, it seems that these two
iudges in fact considered that the plaintiff had abandoned any attempt to have the work
completed in the ordinary course of development; therefore, this branch of the Cunning-
ham test can be reconciled with the facts in Cotter.
49 See, discussion supra.50 See, discussion infra.
51 (1954), 11 W.W.R. (N.S.) 371 (Alta.S.C.)
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on the assumption that the parties will not renege on such deals. However, the
Cotter case has established that such damages must not be awarded, but it does
hold that nominal damages are recoverable even though no nominal damages
were fixed in that case.52
However, in the later case of Albrecht v. Imperial Oil Ltd.,53 the trial
Judge held that the Cotter case did not prohibit him from fixing substantial
damages.54
These two decisions only serve to show how the Cotter decision has
caused confusion by its misinterpretation. The Cotter case did not establish
that substantial damages would never be awarded; it simply established that
only nominal damages will be awarded if the absence of proof makes damages
a matter of speculation. 55 The trial judge's interpretation of Cotter in the
Prudential Trust case was an unjustifiable extension of the Cotter principle.5 6
There has been a vast number of articles written in the United States
dealing with the measure of damages for breach of a covenant to drill a test
well.57 There the damages aspect of such cases is dealt with in three cate-
gories58 depending upon the intent of the parties: (1) where the defendant
has been employed to drill a well on a contract basis and has no interest in
the possible future production; (2) where a lease assignment has been made
based on the expectation of future royalties, the consideration for the lease
being the lessee's agreement to drill a well; and (3) where the plaintiff is
interested in a test well on his property and in the effect of such a well on
adjoining property owned or leased by the plaintiff (the "information con-
tract" situation).
In the first situation the courts generally hold the measure of damages
to be the difference between the reasonable cost of drilling or completing the
well less any part of the contract price remaining unpaid. This resembles the
measure of damages given a landowner in a suit against a builder under an
ordinary construction contract.
In the second and third situations the courts have adopted divergent
rules. Certain states award the cost of drilling; however, this measure is
in conflict with the ordinary rule of damages. Where a well drilled under
the contract would have produced oil which the plaintiff can no longer
extract, he is left without adequate compensation. Conversely, if the cost of
drilling would be more than the royalties which would have resulted, the
plaintiff gets over-compensation. However, if the award given is based on
expected royalties and the plaintiff continues drilling which results in produc-
tion leading to these royalties, then the plaintiff gets double recovery. Then
52 Id. at 374.
53 (1957), 21 W.W.R. 560 (Alta.S.C.).
54 Id. at 566 per Riley, J.
55 See also Krang v. McCutcheon (1920), 19 O.W.N. 161 (Ont.C.A.).
56 J. Ballem, Petroleum and Natural Gas Lease - Damage for Breach of Drilling
Commitment (1957), 35 Can. Bar Rev. 971, 976.
57 For United States articles on the measure of damages for breach of a contract
to drill an oil or gas well, see: 4 A.L.R. (3d) 284; 9 U. of Kansas LRev. 281 (1960-
61); 1959 U. of Ill. Law Forum 631; 13 Wash. & Lee LRev. 207 (1956); 3 U.C.L.A.
L.Rev. 586 (1955-56); 8 Wyom. .J. 142 (1953-54); 22 Tex.L.Rev. 481 (1944).
68 W.O. Roberts, Jr., Damages - Measure of Damages for Breach of Contract to
Drill Oil or Gas Well (1956), 13 Wash. & Lee L.Rev. 207.
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comes the evidentiary problem of establishing the quantum of the lost
royalties.
These problems have led many authors to support the "cost of drilling"
as the proper measure of damages. For example, one author gives this
rationale:
It was a recognition of the practical impossibility of an obligee's proving the
future productivity of a test well that led a majority of states to adopt the "well-
cost" rule. Most courts admit that the cost of drilling is not always an accurate
measure of the obligee's injury, but state that it is capable of reasonably exact
computation, and that to force the obligee to prove his actual damages would in
effect deny him any remedy for the breach of contract or would allow the jury
to indulge in guesswork as to the amount of damages.5 9
Another author has this to say:
... there should also be a more general recognition of the necessity of striking
a proper balance between the value of the unrendered performance of the un-
certainty of proof of damages caused by defendant's breach. In many cases it is
submitted that this can be accomplished by treating the reasonable cost of drilling
or completing the well as a prima facie measure which might have the effect of
discouraging drilling defaults. 60
It is respectfully submitted that the Canadian courts should also adopt such
an approach.
PART IV
The New Horizons - Realistic and Defined Approaches
to the Problem
In 1962, an unusual fact situation arose before the British Columbia
Supreme Court in the case of Worrall v. Northwestern Mutual Insurance Co."'
In this case the plaintiff had his property insured by the defendant company
against fire loss. The policy provided that on the occurrence of a loss by fire
the insurer could elect to repair and rebuild the property instead of making
payment.
In considering the obligations which an insurer against fire loss under-
takes when it elects, as the defendant did, to repair instead of making pay-
ment, and the measure of damages if it fails in fulfilling those obligations,
Hutcheson, J. reviewed a number of American decisions in the absence of
Canadian and English authority. The learned judge avoided the problems of
consideration, benefits, essential terms of an overall plan, substantial per-
formance, and economic waste which the Courts have grappled with in the
cases I have already discussed. He first defined the obligation of the defendant
in simple, yet precise terms:
... the defendant, having elected to repair, was under the duty to repair the pro-
perty so that it would be in substantially as good a condition as it was prior to
the fire.62
59 M. VanDerhoof, Oil and Gas Contract to Drill a Test Well: Measure of
Damages for Breach (1955-56), 3 U.C.LA. L.Rev. 586, 588.
60 W. Scott, Measure of Damages for Breach of a Covenant to Drill a Test Well for
Oil and Gas (1960-61), 9 U. of Kansas LRev. 281, 291.
61 (1963), 36 D.L.R. (2d) 752; (1963), 41 W.W.R. 284 (B.C.S.C.).
62 Id. at 756, 41 W.W.R. at 287.
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The obligation is clear enough: the defendant must give the plaintiff essen-
tially what he bargained for - a house built in a certain specified manner.
Then, in considering the measure of damages, he defined the two situa-
tions which may arise:
(1) If the insurer fails to rebuild or repair after electing to do so, or
abandons the work before it is finished, the measure of damages for breach
of its obligation is the cost of doing or completing the work.
(2) If the repairs are completed but the house as delivered to the insured
is not in substantially the same condition as it was in before the fire, his
measure of damages is the difference in value of the house as it stood before
the fire and its value at the time the insurer offered it to the insured and
ceased to perform labour on it.03
The two situations are quite clear. If the insurer has given substantial
performance and the insured gets something approximating what he bar-
gained for, then his only compensation is in damages for the difference in
value. However, if no performance has been given, the insured must be
placed in a position similar to that which he occupied when the contract was
made - i.e., he must have a house similar to the original one. Therefore, the
cost of building such a house is the correct measure. The insured must have
the house because this was the essential root of the contract. Therefore, the
doctrine of substantial performance definitely affects the measure of damages.
A recent example of how the doctrine of substantial performance affects
the measure of damages is found in Miller v. Advanced Farming Systems
Ltd.04 The facts of that case were straightforward. The plaintiff dairy farmer
contracted with the defendant company to have a dairy barn complex con-
structed according to specified plans and measurements. The trial judge
found, as a fact, that the work had not been done as called for in the contract,
but that there had been substantial performance. He thereupon applied the
doctrine of substantial performance by allowing the defendant his contract
price, less credit to the plaintiff for the deficiencies in the work. Thus, he
applied the difference in value as the correct measure of damages.
However, in the Supreme Court of Canada, Hall, 3. cited authorities65
which stated that the correct measure of damages "is the cost of making
good the defects and omissions in the work which the respondent contracted
to do." 60 Therefore if the contractor is able to show that there has been
substantial performance, then he is entitled to recover his contract price
subject to a deduction equivalent to the cost of altering the work to make it
correspond with the contract specifications.
Thus, the cost of performance is often given as the measure of damages
in building contracts. However, the courts have rarely outlined any clear
criteria upon which this measure will be awarded. An exception was McGarry
0o Id. at 756-760, 41 W.W.R. at 287-294.
04 (1969), 5 D.L.R. (3d) 369 (S.C.C.).
0 Hoenig v. Isaacs, [1952] 2 All E.R. 176 (C.A.); H. Dakin and Co. Ltd. v. Lee,
[1916] 1 K.B. 566 (K.B.D.); and Thornton v. Place (1832), 1 M & Rob. 218, 174 E.R.
74.
00 (1969), 5 D.L.R. (3d) 369 at 371.
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et al. v. Richards, Akroyd & Gall Ltd.67 where the British Columbia Supreme
Court finally defined the conditions under which the cost of performance will
be allowed. Again, as in the Worrall68 case, the test laid down was simple
and without reference to the confusing jargon which had been so predomi-
nant in previous years.
In the McGarry case there was poor workmanship and a deviation
from the plans by the builder in the construction of an apartment building. In
response to the submission by counsel for the plaintiff that the measure of
damages should be the cost of making good the defective work, Davey, 1.
laid down several simple rules to determine whether or not damages will be
awarded on this scale. First, the cost of performance should not be awarded
where the owner does not intend to, or cannot rectify or complete the defec-
tive work, or where he would be acting unreasonably or oppressively in doing
so. The policy behind this principle is obvious - the court will not encourage
economic waste or unjust enrichment. Second, in speaking of the Cunningham
and Cotter decisions, Davey, J. said,
These cases establish that the primary measure of damages for non-performance
of a contract to build on another's land is the diminution in value resulting from
such default. In the case at bar, the work was imperfectly done, but, I can see
no difference in principle.
Cases may arise where the damages for the default should be measured by the
cost of making good the default. This will be so if the cost of performing the work
or making good the defects is less than the diminution in the value of property
caused by the default. In such cases, it is the plaintiff's duty to take any reason-
able steps to mitigate his damage by doing what is required.
Other cases arise where a person's enjoyment of his property is substantiallylessened by the non-performance or the defective performance of the work, and
it is reasonable that he should have the work d.one even though its cost may
exceed the decrease in the market value of the property resulting from the
default. In such cases, the plaintiff is entitled to the cost of doing the work, if it
appears that he intends to, or is likely to have it done, providing he acts
reasonably.6 9
The key word in this approach is the word "substantially". We have dis-
cussed the implication of this word previously. The meaning should be
obvious - the Court will award the cost of performance if what the innocent
party received is not substantially what he bargained for. And in deciding
whether or not the plaintiff got substantially or essentially what he bargained
for, Davey, J. applies this test:
I think the likelihood of the plaintiff doing the work must always be considered
before adopting the cost of remedying the default as the measure of damages,
except where that measure is applied by way of mitigation of damages. Also, the
reasonableness of doing the work must be judged not only by the effect of the
default upon the amenities of the property, but by the relation between the
cost of repairing the default and the diminution in the value of the premises
caused by it.70
Thus, the learned judge lays down two simple principles. First, the higher
award of the cost of performance will not be made if it is unlikely that the
plaintiff will have the work performed. Secondly, the high costs will not be
awarded solely on the basis of a party's not getting what he bargained for -
67 [19541 2 D.L.R. 367 (B.C.S.C.).
68 (1963), 36 D.L.R. (2d) 752; (1963), 41 W.W.R. 284 (B.C.S.C.).
69 [1954] 2 D.L.R. 367 at 389-390.
701d. at 391.
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if the cost of performance is out of all proportion to the damage caused, then
the diminution in value will be awarded. Again, the policy is obvious - the
Court will not encourage economic waste.
Thus, it took over half a century, since the 1882 Wigsell case, for a
Canadian court to finally define the law to be applied for the measure of
damages in building contracts71 in terms which avoid the usual judicial jargon,
and which face the problem realistically from both an economic and common-
sense point of view.
The position in the United States 72 has been dealt with extensively. In
actions for an owner's recovery for breach of a building contract, the following
principles apply.73 Generally, where the contractor abandons a building con-
tract, the measure of damages available to the owner is the reasonable cost
of completion less any part of the contract price remaining unpaid. However,
if the construction is defective, the owner can recover the reasonable cost of
construction in accordance with the contract less such part of the contract
price as has not been paid.74 But if to complete the defective construction
would involve unreasonable economic waste, the owner can recover only the
amount by which the value of the house as left by the builder fell short of
what the value would have been if the contract had been exactly performed,
less any part of the contract price remaining unpaid. These principles certainly
support the position taken by the Ontario courts in the O'Brien case75 with
regard to the economic waste and benefit arguments. However, in the case
of wilful breaches it has been suggested that the cost of performance may be
granted even if uneconomic.76
7 1 For other English cases on damages in building contract, see James v. Hutton
& J. Cook and Sons, [1950] 1 K.B. 9; Jones v. Herkheimer, [1950] 2 K.B. 106; Gross v.
Pohl, [1949] 1 W.W.R. 54; Smiley v. Townshend, [1950] 2 K.B. 311.72For the United States position, see C. Guittard, Building Contracts: Damages
and Restitution (1969), 32 Tex.BJ. 91; Measure of Damages for Defective Performance
of Building Contracts (1958), 43 Minn.L.R. 140, which notes the case of H.P. Droher
and Sons v. Toushin (1957), 250 Minn. 490, 85 N.W. (2d) 273; R. Livingston, Damages
- Oner's Recovery for Breach of a Building Contract in Massachusetts (1954), 34
Bos.U.L.Rev. 518; Cost of Correction or Completion, or Difference in Value as Measure
of Damages for Breach of Construction Work, 76 A.L.R. (2d) 805; Cost of Correction
or Completion, Rather Than Loss in Property Value, as Measure of Damages for
Breach of Contract to Change Condition of Real Property, 123 A.L.R. 515.
One of the more notable cases decided in the United States with regard to con-
tracts to do work or land construction is: Groves v. John Wunder Co. (1935), 205
Minn. 163, 286 N.W. 235; for critical case comments see: (1940), 40 Colum.L.Rev.
323; (1939-40), 25 Cornell L.Q. 287; (1939-40), 53 Harv.L.Rev. 138; (1939-40), 34
II.L.Rev. 501; but for a favourable case comment see (1939-40), 24 Minn.L.Rev. 114.
For a similar set of facts but an opposite decision to the Groves case, see Avery v.
Fredericksen and Westbrook (1944), 154 P. (2d) 41 (Cal.App.) and the case com-
ment at (1944-45), 43 Mich.L.Rev. 987. See also Peevyhouse v. Garland Coal and
Mining Co., Okl. 382 P.(2d)109; aff'd on rehearing, Okl., 382 P.(2d)116 and the case
comment comparing the case to the Groves case: Damages - Measure of Damages -
Cost of Performance versus Diminution in Value for Breach of a Strip-Mining Lease(1964), 49 Iowa L.Rev. 597.
73 R. Livingston, Damages - Owner's Recovery for Breach of a Building Contract
In Massachusetts (1954), 34 Bos.U.L.Rev. 518.
74 This is also the position taken in England: Contracts for the Execution of Work:
Effect of Non-Completion (1955), 22 The Solicitor 153.
75 (1923), 54 D.L.R. 455 (Ont.C.A.).7 8Measure of Damages for Defective Performance of Building Contracts (1958),
43 Minn.L.Rev. 140-142 mentions this point in speaking of the Groves v. Wunder case.
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The conflict in the measure of damages also arises when realty or per-
sonalty is physically damaged or totally destroyed. The generally accepted
rule in cases of realty is that the normal measure of damages is the diminution
in the value of the property.77 Generally, this rule has been applied to the case
of an occupier of the real property. However, there have been several excep-
tions where owner-occupiers of realty have been able to recover the cost of
restoring buildings damaged by a defendant's trespass.78 The English Court of
Appeal recently considered this problem in Harbutt's "Plasticine" Ltd. v.
Wayne Tank and Pump Co. Ltd.79 In that case the defendant company con-
tracted to install equipment in the plaintiff company's factory; however, due
to the defendant company's negligence, the whole factory was destroyed by
fire and a new factory had to be built. The defendants claimed that the
plaintiffs were entitled only to the difference in value of the old factory before
and after the fire (E116,785) rather than the actual cost of replacement
(f146,581). However, the Court had no trouble in deciding that the plain-
tiffs were entitled to the cost of replacement:
'If the article damaged is a motor car of popular make, the plaintiff cannot
charge the defendant with the cost of repair when it is cheaper to buy a similar
car on the market. On the other hand, if no substitute for the damaged article is
available and no reasonable alternative can be provided, the plaintiff should be
entitled to the cost of repair.S0
The policy here is again apparent. First, the purpose of damage awards
in such cases is to restore the plaintiff to the position he occupied before the
loss occurred (i.e. restitution). Thus, if he has lost a chattel, then a replace-
ment can usually be found in the market and the owner gets the value; but
if he has lost a building, then a replacement must be constructed and the
owner gets the cost of replacement. To award the owner the cost of replace-
ment when a substitute chattel is available would be tantamount to encourag-
ing unjust enrichment.
The "failure to drill" problem and the confusion raised by the Cotter
decision have finally been met head-on in Dolly Varden Mines Ltd. (N.P.L.)
v. Sunshine Exploration Ltd. et al.,81 a recent decision of the Supreme Court
of Canada. After nearly twenty years of confusion, the Court utilized the
one recourse which it possessed and to which I referred earlier 82 - it dis-
tinguished the Cotter case and applied the Cunningham doctrine. In the case
the plaintiff was the owner of certain mining properties and agreed with the
defendants to convey a one-half interest in the properties in return for certain
exploratory drilling work to be carried out by the defendants. The defend-
77 See, Salmond on The Law of Torts (15th ed. R. Houston, London: Sweet and
Maxwell, 1969) 750; Winfield on Torts (8th ed. J. Jolowicz, London: Sweet and Max-
well, 1967) 698, n.91; H. Street, Principles on the Law of Damages (London: Sweet
and Maxwell, 1962) 201-202.
78 H. McGregor, Mayne and McGregor on Damages (12th ed. London: Sweet and
Maxwell, 1961) paras. 740-742.
79 [1970] 2 W.L.R. 198; [1970] 1 All E.R. 225. For a discussion of the issue of
the measure of damages in the case, see the case comment in 86 L.Q.Rev. 513, 524-527.
80 Per Widgery J.A., [19701 2 W.L.R. 198 (CA.) at 217; [1970] 1 All E.R. 225
at 240. See also Lord Denning, MR., [1970] 2 W.L.R. at 212; [1970] 1 All E.R. at 236
and Cross, L., [1970] 2 W.L.R. at 219; [1970] 1 All E.R. at 242.
81 (1969), 8 D.L.R. (3d) 441 (S.C.C.), affg (1968) 69 D.L.R. (2d) 209(B.C.C.A.), afl'g (1967), 64 D.L.R. (2d) 683.
82 See, discussion supra at 193.
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ants were to furnish reports of all the work done and were also given the
option, after completion of the first phase of the work (schedule "A"), either
to abandon the project or to continue with the subsequent phases. Having
undertaken a small portion of the work and finding the preliminary results
disappointing, the defendants breached the agreement by not performing the
first phase of the work (schedule "A"). In the original action for damages,
the trial Judge applied the Cunningham principle to award $314,051 based
upon the cost to the plaintiffs of having the work performed. The award was
upheld in the Court of Appeal of British Columbia and thus the sole issue
before the Supreme Court of Canada was the correct measure of damages to
be applied.
Martland, J.., in delivering the judgment of the Court, quickly dis-
tinguished Cotter on the basis that consideration had passed in full in the
instant case but that in Cotter no consideration had ever passed.83 In the
present case the defendant had received full consideration (the transfer of
the one-half interest in the properties), but had failed to perform the schedule
"A" work as promised. And with that distinction, the death-knell of Cotter
was finally sounded."4
Martland, J. then considered exactly what the plaintiffs lost by reason of
the defendant company's default. He pointed out that Sunshine had com-
mitted itself to perform the work because it considered the results would be
of value. Dolly Varden gave full consideration because it would be able to
further develop its property if the results were favourable; if the results were
unfavourable, then the company would still have obtained valuable informa-
tion about the property. However, both parties clearly considered that the
work to be performed would be worth the expense of doing it. Thus, Mart-
land, J. explored the intentions of the parties - to perform work of a defi-
nite specified nature. The first requirement of the Cunningham rule was met
- the work to be performed was part of an overall scheme of works, the
execution of which was necessary for the proper development of the property.
The second part of the rule - that it could fairly be presumed that the owner
intended to carry out the work - was shown both by the intention and the
post-breach conduct of Dolly Varden. However, although the case could
easily be squared with Cunningham, Martland, J. preferred not to lay down
any general rule with regard to damages sustained by a mine owner for breach
of a covenant to perform exploratory or development work. Nevertheless,
there is little doubt that the essence of the decision is to adopt the Cunning-
ham rationale and to award the cost of performance as the proper measure
of damages in such a case. Furthermore, it should be recalled that the
Cunningham rationale was based on no special rule but an application of
the general rule of awarding the expectation interest.,5
Keeping this in mind, it is not difficult to understand how the Court
reached its decision to award damages based on the cost of performance:
83 (1969), 8 D.L.R. (3d) 441 at 450.
04 J. Ballem, Some Second Thoughts on Damages for Breach of a Drilling Com-
mitinent (1970), 48 Can. Bar Rev. 698, 713.
85 See supra notes 37-38, and see discussion supra at 189-190.
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When Sunshine, later, deliberately breached its contact to perform the work, what
was the measure of Dolly Varden's damage? If it had paid cash for the work, it
would clearly be entitled to a repayment of it, and would also have a claim in
damages. The consideration was not in cash, but Sunshine, when it executed the
amending agreement, considered it to be of sufficient value to warrant the expen-
diture necessary to perform the work.
It is pointless, in these circumstances, to suggest that a comparison be made
between the value of the mining property with and without the work being done.
The result of the sch. A work is unknown, and it is unknown because Sunshine
elected to break the contract for its performance. But when Sunshine, by entering
the agreement, acknowledged that, in the light of its future potential benefits under
the agreement, its own suggested programme of work was worth the cost of
performing it, and when Dolly Varden was prepared to give, and did give,
valuable consideration for its performance, I consider that it was entirely proper
for the learned trial Judge to assess the damage resulting from the breach as
being equivalent to the cost of doing the work. In so doing he was seeking to
fulfil the underlying principle stated by Lord Atkinson in Wertheim v. Chicoutimi
Pulp Co., [1911] A.C. 301 at p. 307, and cited by Cartwright, J., in the Cotter
case ... 86
Thus, we go back to the very beginning. The Wertheim rule seeks to
place the parties in the same position as if the contract had been performed.
If the contract had been performed then Dolly Varden would have received
the value of the information concerning the worth of its properties. The
only way by which Dolly Varden could have received this information was
to have the development work done. And the only way to compensate for
not having the work done is to award the cost of performing the work. It
follows then that the appropriate measure of damages is the cost of perform-
ance rather than the difference in value.
Therefore, the result of Dolly Varden is this - Cotter is buried,
Cunningham is revived, and Wertheim reigns supreme. But the difficulty of
applying Wertheim when the cost of performance is in conflict with the
difference in value will probably live forever.
86 (1969), 8 D.L.R. (3d) 441 at 456.
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